DOCTRINE:

Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code thus presupposes that the marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal action for adultery. 

FACTS:

Imelda Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and Erich Geiling, a German national, married in Germany but later separated in April 1982 due to marital discord. In January 1983, Geiling initiated a divorce proceeding in Germany which a German court granted in January 15, 1986, awarding custody of their child to Pilapil. However, shortly after he instituted a divorce proceeding, Geiling filed two adultery complaints in the Philippines against Pilapil in January 23, 1983, alleging affairs with two other men. Although a, assistant fiscal initially recommended dismissing the cases due to lack of evidence, the city fiscal overruled this in January 8, 1986, leading to Pilapil facing adultery charges in the RTC of Manila. Pilapil sought to dismiss these charges, arguing that Geiling, being a foreigner and divorced, lacked standing to file adultery complaints under Philippine law. 

ISSUE:

May Pilapil be prosecuted with adultery despite a valid divorce decree?

RULING:

NO, Pilapil cannot be prosecuted for adultery because a valid divorce decree was already issued, which dissolved the marital bond between her and her spouse at the time the complaint was filed. 

Under Revised Penal Code, specifically Article 344, only the offended spouse has the legal standing to file a complaint for adultery, which presupposes that the marital relationship is still in effect at the time of filing.

The Supreme Court emphasized that the right to initiate an adultery complaint exclusively belongs to the offended spouse, who must have the status of a spouse at the time of filing, thus:

Hence, as cogently argued by petitioner, Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code thus presupposes that the marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal action for adultery. This is a logical consequence since the raison d’etre of said provision of law would be absent where the supposed offended party had ceased to be the spouse of the alleged offender at the time of the filing of the criminal case.

In these cases, therefore, it is indispensable that the status and capacity of the complainant to commence the action be definitely established and, as already demonstrated, such status or capacity must indubitably exist as of the time he initiates the action. It would be absurd if his capacity to bring the action would be determined by his status before or subsequent to the commencement thereof, where such capacity or status existed prior to but ceased before, or was acquired subsequent to but did not exist at the time of, the institution of the case. We would thereby have the anomalous spectacle of a party bringing suit at the very time when he is without the legal capacity to do so.

Simply put, since Pilapil’s husband had already obtained a divorce in Germany, recognized as valid under his national law, he ceased to be her legal spouse. Consequently, he no longer had the legal standing or capacity to file an adultery complaint against Pilapil, as the marriage had already been legally terminated.

Thus, in line with the principles in this decision, an adultery case can only be filed by a complainant who is still legally married to the accused at the time of filing.